Fear and Trembling

Johannes de Silentio - 1843

Preface

Positions his work contra the contemporary philosopher, who refuses to stop at faith, but, rather, seeks to go beyond it. Questions what it would even mean to go beyond faith, and compares this hubris to the modesty of Abraham and older thinkers, who thought a whole life barely long enough to attain faith. This book is decidedly not a philosophical work, and the writer is emphatically opposed to any system. “I throw myself down in deepest submission before every systematic ransacker.”

Exordium

The narrator speaks here of a man who, as he grew older, became less and less capable of understanding Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac, and became possessed with the desire to witness the event. Four possible depictions of the event follow.

I: After traveling in silence for three days, Abraham reveals the point of the journey to Isaac. Isaac begs for his life, uncomprehending, and, at the last minute, Abraham pretends to be an idolator, so that Isaac would hate his father rather than lose faith in God.

II: They go to the mountain, Isaac is saved, but while Isaac flourishes, Abraham never forgets what God asked of him and remains altered for the rest of his life.

III: Abraham rides out alone and begs God’s forgiveness for his willingness to sacrifice Isaac, while simultaneously being totally incapable of understanding why it should be a sin to sacrifice the best to God at his commandment.

IV: The pair rides out; just as he raises the knife, before seeing the animal to sacrifice instead, Abraham’s left hand trembles. Isaac loses faith.

Eulogy on Abraham

The poet rescues the hero from oblivion; it is he who creates the link between generations, and rescues humanity from the despair of total isolation. The greatness of the poet is commensurate with the greatness of his object. And all greatness is great in proportion to the object of love, expectancy, and struggle. Abraham is the greatest of all figures, by virtue o loving God, expecting the impossible, and struggling with God. While it is great to give up a desire, it is greater still to hold to it after giving it up. It is a wonder of faith that it preserved in Abraham and Sarah the youth and capacity to desire a child even in old age.

Preliminary Expectoration

This section tries to put the story of Abraham into perspective, by imagining our reaction if a contemporary, upon hearing it, were moved to sacrifice his own son. Our tendency to whitewash the story, to claim that Abraham was willing to sacrifice “the best,” obscures the horror and contradiction of the story. Faith called the act a sacrifice, while ethics would term it murder. So the question must be faced whether or not faith is higher than ethics, because, if not, Abraham was simply a murderer.

Johannes de Silentio claims to have no faith himself, but asserts that nonetheless it is higher than anything, particularly philosophy, and mocks the idea that Abraham is quite simple to comprehend, while Hegel is difficult.

So what is faith? To “lose one’s understanding by virtue of the finite and win it back again by the virtue of the finite.” Faith requires a double move; it requires that Abraham both believe that God required the sacrifice, while simultaneously believing that God could not demand such a thing from him. “The movement of faith must continually be made by virtue of the absurd, but yet in such a way, please note, that one does not lose the finite but gains it whole and intact” (37).

Knights of infinite resignation exist, who give everything up for the infinite. Infinite resignation is the last moment before faith, but though their steps are “light and bold,” but they are not true knights of faith. The knight of faith - provided he even exists - is completely unrecognizable, but is a perfect mixture of the infinite and finite. He is continually giving up everything and grasping everything again by virtue of the absurd. Everything he does is by virtue of the absurd (40). He looks like a tax collector, he is totally at home in the world, while living totally before God.

Problemata I: the teleological suspension of the ethical

In the world, we consider the ethical to be the universal, and the ethical task of the individual is is to annul the individual into the universal. Faith, however, claims that the individual is higher than the universal by means of the universal.

The text explains the uniqueness of Abraham by way of contrast to the tragic hero. The tragic hero is great because of moral virtue, while Abraham is great because of personal virtue. The tragic hero sacrifices everything for the ethical; Abraham was tempted by the ethical. While the tragic hero is justified by the result, Abraham never can be, because the result, the outward consequences, are irrelevant to faith. Moreover, unlike the tragic hero, Abraham cannot speak, because to speak means to engage in or express the ethical, and faith demands the teleological suspension of the ethical.

Problemata II: Is there an absolute duty to God?

Kierkegaard begins here with what I take to be a polemic again Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. He rejects the idea that religiosity can be reduced to the ethical. to claim that ever duty is a duty to God is to say that we have no specific duty to God. It’s to say that there is nothing incommensurable with human life; radical alterity never intrudes.

Whereas Hegel claims the outer is higher than the inner, the expressed higher than the latent, faith privileges the inner over the outer. The paradox of faith is that interiority is incommensurable with the external.

The man of faith, then, determines his relation to the universal (i.e. ethical) by reference to the absolute; the absolute does not determine his relation to the ethical. This is why the knight of faith cannot make himself understood. So absolute duty can lead to unethical action, but it cannot make Abraham stop loving. This is the difficulty of interpreting the sacrifice. By ethical terms, Abraham was going to commit murder, which is an act of hate. But in terms of faith, Abraham’s sacrifice was really a profound act of love. No one can see this interior state, though, which is what makes faith so terrifying. Abraham lacked the security of the tragic hero, who could give up his self for the universal.

Problemata III: Was it ethically defensible for Abraham to conceal his knowledge?

If Problemata II tried to explain Abraham’s action by way of contrast to the ethical figure, the tragic hero, Problemata III explains it in contrast to the aesthetic figure. Aesthetics has no room for renunciation. two lovers might perhaps renounce each other, but they would get each other back through coincidence. Ethics has no room for coincidence. Aesthetics demands hiddenness - in this case, that the lovers hide their passion - and rewards it. Ethics demands full disclosure and punishes hiddenness. Ethics demands the Agamemnon tell Iphigenia the truth. The aesthetic hero can speak, but will not; the ethical hero must speak; the man of faith cannot speak.

That Abraham did not tell his family of his deed proves it was not ethical. Even Abraham’s last response, that God will provide the lamb, is a form of speech which does not disclose anything. He speaks ironically. To say he knows nothing would be to lie, to say the truth would be impossible, thus, the only option is to speak without saying anything.

Epilogue

Each generation begins primitively. No generation, for example, learns to love from the previous one. Faith is like love, it is love. It is the highest passion, which we may never reach, much less go beyond.

Phillips - Religious Belief and Language Games

Can religious beliefs be called language-games? People who answer "no" worry that if religious beliefs are isolated language games, it becomes difficult to see why they should be cherished.

I. In his 'Lecture on Ethics,' Wittgenstein distinguishes between absolute (the good) and relative (a good chair) judgments of value. Belief in God has a point only if certain consequences follow, which seems to falsify its absolute character for some. But Phillips wants to show that there is a certain logic to religious belief: it is not the outcome of events which is to determine whether God is victorious, but faith in God which determines what is regarded as victory (125). Love of God thus determines what is important. People who deny these two points of view falsify the nature of religious belief.

II. Wittgenstein asked if the non-believer really contradicts the believer when he says that he does not believe what the believer believes. There must be a common problematic to assert contradiction. The reality of God thus cannot be assessed by resorting to some common measure. We should resist the craving for generality in analyzing religious belief. What is involved in belief is not "weighing evidence or reasoning to a conclusion" but the ways in which it influences and regulates a person's life. Wittgenstein shows how the matter does not come down to a common measure when he writes, "I think differently, in a different way. I say different things to myself. I have different pictures. It is this way: if someone said: 'Wittgeinstein, you don't take illness as punishment, so what do you believe?' - I'd say: 'I don't have any thoughts of punishment'" (129-30). Believing in something means putting one's trust in it, sacrificing for it, letting it regulate one's life. Belief in the Last Judgment is not a testable hypothesis, but nonetheless absolute in determining their thinking. We have to realize that there are situations in which there are blunders and those in which the word blunder doesn't really apply. For a blunder, belief in God would be too big to count.

III. So, to recap, religious beliefs have an absolute character but they are not testable and decidable by some common scientific measure. But this is not to say that religion belongs to the sphere of the "unsayable." Rush Rhees, in his essay on Wittgenstein's builders, says that at the same time as the builder's language is used on the job, it is also used at home and in other contexts. Similarly, the language of religious worship is not simply cut off from everything outside. If it were an isolated language game, it would be no more than an esoteric game. Religion would then simply be a neat set of rules, and it would be impossible to distinguish between genuine and sham worship. In short, religion must take the world seriously. If religious believers try to explain away suffering, one may accuse them of not taking it seriously. The meaning and force of religious beliefs depend in part on the relation of these beliefs with features of human existence other than religion (137).

A religious belief could be read as a testable hypothesis, in which case it could be proved a blunder. Or it could be read as having a different meaning. The mother placing a garland on the statue of the Virgin Mary may not think the garland's value is prudential but she may be venerating the birth of her child as God's gift, thanking him for it and contemplating the virtues of motherhood as found in the mother of Jesus (137-38). "The beliefs involved as not testable hypotheses, but ways of reacting to and meeting such situations" (138). From the cruder perspective, the protection of the child determines whether or not the act of bringing the child to the Virgin and the alleged holiness of the Virgin have been efficacious or not. From the proper perspective from which to understand religious belief, the holiness of the Virgin determines the nature of protection (139). In conclusion, it does not make sense to ask for a proof of the validity of religious beliefs (141).

Flew et Al - Theology and Falsification

Flew: If we take religious claims to be assertions, there must be something that would count against making such an assertion. In the case of the invisible gardener from Wisdom's parable, the believer's assertion is so eroded by qualification as to no longer be an assertion. Flew's question: just what would have to happen to entitle us to say that God does not exist?

Hare: Let's say a friend believes that all dons are trying to kill him, despite all evidence to the contrary. That in which we differ from this lunatic = our respective bliks. He has an insane blik about dons; we have a sane one. Hume showed us that differences in bliks, which determine our worlds, cannot be settled by observation. Flew makes the mistake of asking for explanation; it is rather "by our bliks that we decide what is and what is not an explanation" (17). Hare introduces the distinction between "minding" and showing "concern:" the explorers in the garden are trying to settle an empirical matter, the lunatic is expressing real care.

Mitchell: Flew makes one error, which is to think that theologians would deny that the fact of pain counts against the assertion that God loves men (18). In fact, it is a real problem for theologians (the problem of evil). Mitchell tells another parable about a resistance member who meets a Stranger who convinces him that he is the head of the resistance. Despite evidence to the contrary, the resistance member continues to believe that the Stranger is who he says he is. But he would simply be insane if he didn't recognize that the Stranger's behavior to the contrary did in fact count against him. Contra Hare, people can admit things that contradict their bliks. The Christian always in danger of sliding into vacuity, where nothing is allowed to contradict their beliefs.

Flew: In Mitchell's story, the case is a bit easier because the Stranger is a man. Shouldn't God's omnipotence, omniscience, etc. prevent him from having to put on the airs the Stranger "has" to? Hare's concept of the blik is interesting but he avoids the question of real cosmological beliefs. If they are not intended as assertions, many religious statements are ridiculous. He concludes by invoking Orwell's concept of "doublethink" and warning philosophers of religion against it.

Wisdom - Gods

Thanks to the advance of science, the existence of God is not really a question of experimental hypothesis anymore. Wisdom also wants to bracket the question of the expectation of a world to come as it influences belief in Gods. He wants to instead focus on belief in a world here but beyond our senses. The question about the existence of God (divine Mind) must be expanded into a few related questions, including 1) are we ever justified in believing in mind, 2) are there non-animal or non-human mind patterns out there in the world, and 3) how do we know something is mind-like enough?

Wisdom recounts the story of two people talking about whether a couple is happy. Nothing from reason can settle the matter definitively, which is to say that science/reason does not have an exclusive grip on revelation. He tells the story of the unseen gardener to the same effect: one person thinks a gardener has been there to clean up the shrubs, the other thinks not. Arguments are deployed, but those arguments do not change the fact that the two people are observing and acknowledging the same reality.

The theistic issue is not settlable by calculation. In courts of law, for instance, we often are dealing not simply with facts but with showing whether certain parties displayed care or negligence (194). The reasons deployed in such instances are like the legs of a chair, not like the links of a chain. Reasoning is horizontal, not vertical. They are deployed with the hope of providing a cumulative effect that has a logic of its own.

As with two people judging art, there is a certain logic to it but its not simply rationality. Wisdom invokes the "connecting technique:" as in law, one can look for precedence, connecting the current situation to others analogically. Sometimes, wrongheadesness/heartedness can be traced back to a mismanagement of language, but more often, it stems from that which has not even been put into language (200).

In arguing about these things, we look for unconscious reasons, both good and bad, that the discussant is not aware of. Wisdom thinks of our reliance on unconscious motives to explain these things is a continuation and not a break with a certain theological discourse about the existence of gods. The "facts" which makes belief in God seem childish are "hidden powers" within us (204). The Greeks didn't talk about repressing instincts but they did speak of not appeasing Dionysus. Similarly, we may not be talking about the existence of God but we do talk about the unconscious.

Hobbes and the Cause of Religious Toleration

Edwin Curley

Hobbes believed in the subordination of Church to State, believing the sovereign ought to decide what should not be taught, and what should be, specifically the doctrine of total obedience. However, the sovereign should also determine what books are canonical and how scripture is to be interpreted.

Hobbes found the doctrines that ‘faith and sanctity are attained through supernatural infusion, not reason,’ and that ‘whatever man does against his conscience is sin.’ Both doctrines were seen as firmly supported by Scripture and essential to promoting religious toleration.

Yet because these doctrines were interested mainly in promoting the peace, they allowed people to believe whatever they wanted, provided it didn’t lead to people acting seditious. Indeed, he even suggested in the Behemoth that too much repression would invoke bitterness, and claimed he sought a middle ground between too much liberty and too much repression.

In doing so, Hobbes was siding with the Independents and theological radicals of the Civil War years, against the oppressive policy of the Presbyterians and Anglicans, putting him on Locke’s side. At the same time, in 1666-1670, Parliament was discussing bills against atheism, which could punish with banishment or imprisonment any denial of the immortality of the soul or the eternal torment of the wicked in hell, or the divine authority of the canon. There was even a motion that Hobbes and his books be burned. Thus, Hobbes destroyed part of his papers.

There were also theological reasons for tolerance; Hobbes claimed that humans only had to obey the laws of nature and that of the state, not the 10 Commandments. Additionally, he argued that faith in Jesus didn’t require belief in his divinity, only in his status as the earthly messiah. Hobbes, then, could be read as an Erasmian liberal, who emphasized conduct over belief, and minimized theology.

Curley claims Hobbes was part of the ‘radical Enlightenment,’ which sought to sweep away old structures and authorities. He cites Hobbes’s weak affirmation of creation, which amounted to affirming it because it was customary. He also claims Hobbes didn’t deny providence, but stripped it of its comforting power, and, likewise, didn’t explicitly deny miracles, but was skeptical about particular miracles. Basically, Hobbes operated by ‘suggestion through disavowal,’ stopping just short of the heretical conclusions implied by his argument.

Hobbes also opposed any ecclesiastical authority which attempted to institute a division between the laity and clergy, or exercise control over the lives of individuals. His main target of his critique, seen in Book IV of Leviathan, is Christian, mainly the Catholics and Presbyterians. He claims that they exploited the seeds of religiosity - anxiety about the future, causality, etc - to make the masses more obedient. Consequently, Hobbes suggests the need to be skeptical of anyone claiming to be a prophet, as such a stance facilitates the effort to attain more power.

The piece ends by pointing to moments where Hobbes argued for something like total freedom of belief, provided subjects adhere to the law of the sovereign.

The Bible and Protestantism in Leviathan

A.P. Martinich

Though scholars tend to debate how sincere Hobbes’s religiosity was, with the bulk claiming that he wasn’t particularly devout, this article focuses merely on what he represents himself as believing regarding the Bible, theology, and ecclesiology.

The Bible

Hobbes believes the Old Testament was written over a long period of time by many others. He also claims Moses did not write all of the Pentateuch, using as evidence the use of past tense in some narration, and descriptions of the death of Moses, which would have been incoherent if Moses were the author. Martinich claims Hobbes was the first to hold this opinion in Europe, which seems off.

The New Testament, in contrast, was written relatively close to the events it describes, either by people who knew Jesus or who lived shortly thereafter, as with Paul. However, unlike other contemporaries, he rejected the claim that the Bible had been altered by Jews or human error noting that it contained many statements critical of priests, and, as priests had largely been in charge of it, were there alteration, those statements would have been the first excised.

Hobbes was a materialist, denying the immortality of the soul, and though that sounds as if he were an atheist, both to us and to his contemporaries, in fact there is nothing in the Bible that explicitly asserts the existence of the afterlife. On the contrary, it is clear in Job that no such thing exists. He also claimed God was a body, angels were material messengers, and that the kingdom of God was on earth.

Theology

Theology here means statements that elaborate on orthodox propositions. Hobbes was somewhere between Luther and Calvin on questions of salvation. He believed the sinner ought to desire salvation and endeavor to achieve it. Though this does not, in fact, fulfil God’s law, God acts as if it did. He also bought into prelapsarian double predestination.

In addition to believing in predestination, Hobbes was a determinist, asserting that every event has a cause, and only events are causes. Determinism doesn’t necessarily lead to predestination, but the two are compatible, which Martinich sees as logical, claiming it would be odd if his science and theology were at odds.

Hobbes is ambivalent about the idea that sinners burn in eternal hellfire, sometimes claiming hellfire to be metaphorical, sometimes claiming that an infinite number of sinners suffered for a finite time. Of course, there is something odd about Hobbes worrying about the problem, as he asserts that we can’t properly say anything about God that isn’t an honorific; thus, ’the damned burn eternally’ should be a way of honoring God, rather than an actual statement of fact.

Hobbes believed Christ died only for the elect, and that his death did not ‘satisfy’ man’s debt to God, because those terms would turn sin into a commodity. Rather, man was saved by God’s mercy alone. Faith and obedience are required for salvation, meaning all one has to do is believe in Jesus.

Ecclesiology and Liturgy

Hobbes, while objecting to the anthropomorphization of God, had no objection to a rich liturgy, filled with bells and whistles, saying that it honored God. He also thought that in the ideal world there would be uniform worship, but grudgingly supported Independency, the movement to let each church govern itself.

Hobbes - Leviathan, Part II: Of Commonwealth

17. Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition of a Common-wealth: The particularly human passions run counter to the laws of nature and thus must be subdued. The only way to do this is to give a sovereign authority the means to punish, the means to induce fear, in order to uphold the contract (114). Definition of commonwealth: "one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defense" (114). The institution of sovereignty is the soul of the artificial person known as the Leviathan, that fearful monster which prevents us from slipping into the state of nature, and the sovereign himself its head. He who does not have sovereign power is called subject. The sole purpose of the commonwealth is to escape the state of nature. Commonwealth can be established by force (acquisition) or by agreement (institution).

18. Of the Rights of Sovereigns by Institution: a) subjects cannot change the form of government, b) sovereign power cannot be forfeited, c) dissenters yield to majority when declaring sovereign, d) the sovereign cannot injure an innocent subject, e) the sovereign cannot be put to death, f) the sovereign may determine the acceptability of ideas and censor them when necessary, g) the sovereign prescribes legislative rules, h) the sovereign has judicial power in controversies, i) the sovereign may make war and peace, j) the sovereign may choose counselors, k) the sovereign has powers or reward and punishment, l) the sovereign may make civil appointments. Hobbes ends the chapter by admitting that sovereigns may be hurtful, but the state of nature is much worse.

19. Of the several kinds of Commonwealth by Institution, and of the Succession to Sovereign Power: a) monarchy (one sovereign), b) aristocracy (group of sovereigns), c) democracy (people = sovereign). Monarchy is best: the king's body = public, political body (two bodies). Sovereign groups do not share body with the public. Monarch can also receive better counsel, his policies will be more consistent, civil war is less likely, and the succession of power is more easily determined. Hobbes spends a few pages talking about the problem of succession to end the chapter.

20. Of Dominion, Paternal and Despotical: Sovereignty by acquisition contains all the elements of sovereignty by institution. In the case of sovereignty by institution, the sovereign's dominion is like that of a parent over a child. If there be no contract, the dominion is in the mother. As in a family, where mother and child cede power to the father in order for stability, subjects cede power to the sovereign; this is why he calls it paternal dominion. Dominion acquired is called despotical, as the relationship obtained is more of master to slave rather than father to child. But the contract, under both paternal and despotical dominion, is the same. Hobbes ends the chapter by quoting scripture to back his points.

21. Of the Liberty of Subjects: Liberty = the absence of external impediments to action. A freeman is able to do what he wants to do. Liberty need not be opposed to fear or necessity. Within the artificial bonds of the sovereign, subjects still have liberty because their "bonds" are self-imposed. The liberty of the subject is thus consistent with the unlimited power of the sovereign. We sometimes think of freedom as the freedom of the sovereign alone, but we shouldn't be misled into thinking that this is the only kind of liberty. He disapprovingly quotes Aristotle, who says that men can only be free under a democracy. In the Leviathan, though fear and power are present, as in the state of nature, the subject has consented to let the sovereign wield fear and power, and is thus still free. For Hobbes, as opposed to Aristotle, freedom can only exist when subjects are secured by a sovereign. Nonetheless, the subject has the inalienable right of self-preservation and is never bound to injure himself. The sovereign's whole function is to insure the protection of his subjects; inasmuch as the sovereign fails in this role, the contract is void and people are back in the state of nature.

22. Of Systems Subject, Political and Private: Systems of Leviathan = groups of individuals joined by some interest (towns, provinces, trade organizations, etc.). Regular systems have representatives. Reps are analogous to sovereign, but do not have absolute power. Political systems established by sovereign, private systems established by people's own volition. Each part of the Leviathan mimics other systems: individual body, family, small groups, etc.

23. Of the Public Ministers of Sovereign Power: Public ministers are employed by the sovereign to help administer the commonwealth, to help instruct the people, as judges, to execute his orders, and as counselors.

24. Of the Nutrition, and Procreation of a Commonwealth: Commodities are commonwealth's nutrition (and the public is not to be put on a diet!). The laws of distribution are dictated by the sovereign. Money is the blood that circulates throughout. The Leviathan bears children: plantations, colonies.

25. Of Counsel: Command is when a man says do this of that without giving a reason. Counsel is when someone says do this or that and provides the reasons. Counselors to the sovereign are worthy if they are knowledgeable and if their interests coincide with that of the sovereign.

26. Of Civil Laws: Civil Law = laws particular to a commonwealth which are commanded of subjects by word, writing or some other sufficient sign. The sovereign is the legislator of all civil laws, though he himself is not subject to them. The history of a law is not important in comparison to its consent by the sovereign. In every civilization, the natural law is part of the civil law. Once made, the law must be publicized in order to be enforced. Hobbes calls the comprehension of the instructions of natural reason fidelity, a branch of natural justice. Ultimately, interpretation of the law falls to the sovereign, though he may appoint lower judges to arbitrate for him in certain matters. The things that make one a good judge include: 1) a right understanding of the principle law of nature, equity, 2) contempt of unnecessary riches, 3) to be able to divest oneself of passions, 4) patience to hear. Hobbes ends the chapter by offering up a few categorizations of different kinds of law, including one division between natural (eternal) and positive (not eternal) laws, the latter of which can be both human and divine. He also distinguishes between fundamental (nec. to the existence of a commonwealth) and not fundamental laws.

27. Of Crimes, Excuses and Extenuations: A sin is a transgression of a laws and the contempt of a legislator, a commission. A crime is an omission of what the law has commanded. There is only crime in relation to a civil law. While ignorance of the natural law has to excuse, ignorance of the civil law may be excused when the perpetrator can demonstrate reasonable ignorance of a particular law. Hobbes takes some time to warn against "false teachers," who misinterpret the law, draw erroneous inferences, are led by their passions, etc. He then catalogues various crimes and their causes.

28. Of Punishments and Rewards: A punishment is an evil inflicted by public authority to the end of encouraging obedience. He lists a few qualifications of punishment, including that it must be executed by a public body, that it must be inflicted after a public trial, and that it be inflicted with an eye toward future good. He also lists various forms of punishment. The punishment of innocent subjects is against the law of nature, but it is okay to send subjects to war. The sovereign can also employ certain subjects to carry out punishments but can never ask a criminal to punish himself (again, contradicting the law of nature). The actions of the sovereign can never be punished, for he is the origin of the law. Rewards can be given to subjects either as a gift or as salary.

29. Of those things that Weaken, or tend to the Dissolution of a Commonwealth: An unhealthy Leviathan can result 1) if the sovereign lacks absolute power, 2) if there is no civil law, 3) if subjects believe in conscience over duty, 4) if subjects are faithful to the supernatural rather than the sovereign, 5) if the sovereign is subject to the laws he creates, 6) if the subjects maintain a sense of individual property, 7) if individuals divide up sovereign power, 8) if commonwealth attempts to imitate other nations, 9) if the commonwealth imitates Greeks and Romans, 10) if the Leviathan splits between the civil and the religious, 11) if the government is mixed. All of these may be considered "birth defects" which lead to civil war.

30. Of the Office of the Sovereign Representative: The office of the sovereign is there to ensure the safety of the people. The sovereign may not relinquish any rights of sovereignty. Subjects must be made dutiful, to respect their parents, to not desire to injure, and to do all of this from the heart (as if the other stuff weren't enough!). Education is the means to implanting this kind of duty.

31. Of the Kingdom of God by Nature: God's word is known in three ways: reason, revelation and prophecy, but universal laws have only been decreed by reason and prophecy. God's sovereignty is derived from his omnipotence. God's natural laws are dictated by reason and at the foundation of the Leviathan. Then a bunch of prep work for Book III, where he addresses prophetical laws.